about the human consequences of his demand for Pakistan. On the same page, the reader is told that Jinnah's "frigid demeanour was as legendary as Nehru's charm". Jinnah is also described as sleazy, lusting for a 16-year old girl when he was already in his 40s. Hajari does not explain how somebody can be irascible, sleazy and frigid at the same time.
Nehru, the author concedes, had flaws as well. As Hajari writes, Nehru refused to accept the Muslim League as a coalition partner in 1937, except on humiliating terms that included the unconditional merger of Muslim League parliamentary parties into the Congress. Nehru's arrogant and aloof behavior was precisely what Jinnah needed to strengthen anxieties that Muslims had regarding a Hindu majority-dominated India. And yet, the book leaves little doubt about who is the villain of the story.
What is perhaps most problematic with this account is that the idea of creating Pakistan is described as little more than a ploy used by Jinnah to get his political career back on track after the return of Gandhi from South Africa and the rise of the Hindu-dominated Congress pushed him to the sidelines. After his young wife commits suicide, Jinnah moves into a somber house with his evil sister Fatima. While Nehru is driven by high ideals, the book suggests, Jinnah is moved by bitterness and the desire for revenge.
Yet the idea of Pakistan was far more than a mere bargaining chip invented by Jinnah. Hajari remains silent on key figures such as Muhammad Iqbal, one of the most important figures in Urdu literature and the philosopher who inspired the Pakistan Movement. The author seems to suggest it would have merely taken a more moderate representative of the Muslim League to avoid Partition.
Yet this argument overlooks that the British-supervised elections in 1937 and 1946, which the Hindu-dominated Congress won easily, only hardened Muslim identity, and made partition inevitable. The British policy of defining communities based on religious identity, which fundamentally altered Indian self-perceptions, requires far more attention to explain the dynamics that led to Partition. Churchill, in particular, saw consolidating a Muslim identity in India and stoking sectarian tensions as essential to prolonging British rule on the subcontinent (he actively supported Jinnah's cause in the years before 1947).
Hajari recognizes that Mountbatten's decision to anticipate Britain's withdrawal and let an unprepared mapmaker draw the borders within 40 days (without visiting the regions affected, as the author correctly notes) turned the whole project far more deadly than it could have been under other
